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The Consumer Trust Fund: A Cy Pres Solution to
Undistributed Funds in Consumer Class Actions
When a class of consumers settles or prevails in a class action, the
funds collected from the defendant normally are used to cover individual
damage claims, administrative costs, and attorney's fees. Despite the
class representative's best efforts to notify all class members and solicit
claims for damages, however, a pool of undistributed funds often re-
mains.' For example, in the federal district court case of West Virginia v.
Chas. Pfizer & Co.,2 approximately $32 million remained unclaimed from
a $100 million settlement.3 In In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation,
4
$8 million remained in a "reserve fund" after a federal district court ap-
proved a $200 million settlement. Similarly, over $1 million in settle-
ment funds remained unclaimed in the California Superior Court case of
Vasquez v. Avco Financial Services.
5
Surplus damages and settlement funds in class actions may remain
undistributed for two reasons. First, funds may not be distributed be-
1. In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. 1091, 1104 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("In
virtually every class action, there remains a reserve fund after all claims and expenses have
been paid."), aff'd, 744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); see
also 2 H. NEWBERG, CLASS ACTIONS §§ 10.13-.14, at 370-72 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing the
unclaimed balance of class recovery remaining after individual distribution and occasions
when unclaimed balances arise).
2. 314 F. Supp. 710, 722-23, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971), discussed in T. BARTSH, F. BODDY, B. KING & P. THOMPSON, A
CLASS ACTION SUIT THAT WORKED (1978) [hereinafter A CLASS ACTION SUIT THAT
WORKED].
3. For a discussion of the settlement, see Note, Collecting Overcharges from the Oil
Companies: The Department of Energy's Restitutionary Obligation, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1039,
1052-53 (1980) [hereinafter Note, Collecting Overcharges" see also Note, Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin-Fluid Recovery, Minihearings and Notice in Class Actions, 54 B.U.L. REV. 111, 119
(1974) [hereinafter Note, Fluid Recovery]; Note, The Cy Pres Solution to the Damage Distribu-
tion Problems of Mass Class Actions, 9 GA. L. REV. 893, 915 (1975) [hereinafter Note, The Cy
Pres Solution]; Comment, Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation in Consumer Class
Actions, 70 MICH. L. REV. 338, 367-69 (1971); Note, An Economic Analysis of Fluid Class
Recovery Mechanisms, 34 STAN. L. REV. 173, 180 (1981) [hereinafter Note, An Economic
Analysis].
4. 557 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
dismissed, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
5. No. NCC 11933 B (Los Angeles Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 1984) (order approving cy pres
remedy).
[729]
cause all class members cannot be located and notified of their right to
submit a claim for damages, 6 or because some class members fail to sub-
mit a claim.7 Second, individual damages may be so small that notifica-
tion and distribution costs exceed the recoverable amount or reduce it to
a pittance.8 In either event, the courts and attorneys are challenged with
designing a distribution scheme that best benefits the uncompensated
class members while minimizing management costs and judicial
involvement.
In solving the problem of undistributed funds, courts have some-
times resorted to the cy pres doctrine, adapted from the law of trusts.
The term "cy pres" is derived from the Norman French expression cy
pres comme possible, which means "as near as possible." 9 Traditionally,
the cy pres doctrine has been applied to preserve testamentary charitable
gifts that otherwise would fail: if a charitable gift can no longer be car-
ried out as the testator intended, the doctrine allows the "next best" use
of the funds to satisfy the testator's intent "as near as possible."'10 In the
class action context, cy pres mechanisms have become both useful and
controversial means of distributing benefits to the "next best" class when
injured class members, for whatever reason, cannot be compensated
individually. "
6. For a discussion of this problem, see Berk, Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.: The Advent of
the Consumer Class Action in California, 10 U.S.F. L. REv. 651, 651 n.5 (1976) (analyzing
settlement in Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967)).
7. See, e.g., Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. at 1104. Residual funds often
remain due to both unascertainable and unresponsive class members in the same case. Id. at
1107-08.
8. See, e.g., State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 464, 715 P.2d 564, 565, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 605, 606 (1986) (35 to 40 cent recovery per pair of jeans, with an average individual
recovery of $2.60- $3.00); see also Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 973, 124 Cal.
Rptr. 376, 385 (1975) ("trifling" damages to individual consumers misled by defendant's
advertising).
9. E. FISCH, THE CY PRES DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES § 1000, at 1 (1950). The
term "fluid recovery" sometimes is used synonymously with "cy pres" in the class action con-
text, and the term also designates price reduction, which is one type of cy pres distribution
mechanism.
10. Id.
11. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 841 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (Cy
pres mechanisms are "regularly used as a settlement mode in consumer class actions."); see,
e.g., Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. at 1104 ($8 million used to establish antitrust
research foundation subject to superior equitable claims of nonclaiming class members); In re
Three Mile Island Litig., 557 F. Supp. 96, 97 (M.D. Pa. 1982) ($5 million of a S25 million
settlement earmarked for public health fund); In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 73 F.R.D.
322, 354 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("Classwide recovery of damages has been upheld in a number of
disputes as being consistent with due process."); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F.
Supp. 710, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.) (portion of settlement funds set
aside for public health programs), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Bebchick v. Public Utils.
Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 203-04 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963) (fund established
on behalf of transit riders); State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 479-80, 715 P.2d 564,
575-76, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605, 616-17 (1986) (damage fund divided among all claimants by lower
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The consumer trust fund is one application of the cy pres doctrine in
the distribution of excess or undistributable funds in consumer class ac-
tions. The primary goal of establishing a trust fund from undistributed
settlement funds or judicially determined damages is to further the inter-
ests of absent class members. 12 Applying the cy pres doctrine to the dis-
tribution of settlement and damages recoveries in consumer class actions
can also advance other public interests, such as deterring future unlawful
practices by the defendant and disgorging the defendant's illegal profits
to avoid unjust enrichment at the expense of consumers. 13 Competing
against these goals, however, is the policy against conferring windfall
benefits on unaggrieved individuals. In addition, cy pres mechanisms can
potentially violate the due process rights of defendants. The tension
among these conflicting policies and goals is the primary reason for the
controversy surrounding the propriety of cy pres remedies in distributing
settlement or damage funds.
This Note examines the use of the consumer trust fund as a distribu-
tion mechanism for settlement or damage funds in consumer class ac-
tions. Although this analysis is applicable to all jurisdictions, 14 this Note
court; remanded by California Supreme Court for disposition of residual funds); Cory v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 33 Cal. 3d 522, 528, 658 P.2d 749, 752-53, 189 Cal. Rptr. 386, 389-90 (1983)
(unclaimed refunds should escheat to the state); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433
P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967) (taxicab fares lowered until illegal profits disgorged); Mar-
ket St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 28 Cal. 2d 363, 373, 171 P.2d 875, 881 (although not a class
action, undistributed overcharges collected from the railway were given to the City of San
Francisco to finance repairs to the railway, which it had recently acquired), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 793 (1946); Vasquez v. Avco Fin. Servs., No. NCC 11933 B (Los Angeles Super. Ct. Apr.
24, 1984) ($1.4 million in undistributed funds entrusted to Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., West Coast Regional Office to use for projects in the public interest). But see, e.g.,
Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 72 (4th Cir. 1977) (denying aggregation of
damages as a means of rendering class more manageable for certification), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 968 (1978); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1973) (fluid recov-
ery held to be "illegal, inadmissible as a solution of the manageability problems of class actions
and wholly improper"), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) [hereinafter Eisen III];
Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43, 55-56 (D. Del. 1974) (anti-
trust case in which fluid recovery held to erode due process); Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual
Antitrust Review, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 41 (1972) (" 'fluid class' concept extends judicial
power beyond that point that the law permits or that wisdom would allow."); Malina, Fluid
Class Recovery as a Consumer Remedy in Antitrust Cases, 47 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 477, 492-93
(1972) (fluid recovery considered improper in cases brought under the Clayton Antitrust Act).
12. For example, the settlement of Vasquez v. Avco Fin. Servs., No. NCC 11933 B (Los
Angeles Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 1984), provided for undistributed funds to be awarded to Consum-
ers Union of United States, Inc., West Coast Regional Office, to benefit those who otherwise
would have received a refund. See infra notes 183-90 and accompanying text.
13. Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 675-77 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917 (1982).
14. No state expressly prohibits cy pres distribution, and three states authorize it by stat-
ute: Iowa, IOWA R. Civ. P. 42.1-.20, New Jersey, N.J. Civ. P. R. 4:32-2(c), and North Da-
kota, N.D. R. Civ. P. 23(o)(3)(E). The California Supreme Court approved the consumer
trust fund in State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 715 P.2d 564, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605
(1986). Case law in Arizona and New York, however, does provide precedent for disallowing
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focuses on California and federal courts. Section I provides a brief over-
view of class action procedures, focusing on Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23 and California class action statutes. Section II examines three
specific applications of the cy pres doctrine-governmental escheat, price
reduction, and claimant fund-sharing-as they apply to the distribution
of settlement and damage funds in consumer class actions. Finally, sec-
tion III examines the consumer trust fund and its effectiveness in com-
parison with the three cy pres mechanisms discussed in the previous
section. This Note argues that the consumer trust fund should be used
creatively for the "next best" distribution of funds that remain in con-
sumer class action settlements and damage awards. The Note demon-
strates that, compared with alternative distribution schemes, the
consumer trust fund provides the best long-term results to class members
of all socioeconomic groups, without disruption of the marketplace and
with a minimum of judicial involvement.
I. Overview of Class Actions
A. History and Purpose
The class action originated in the English courts of chancery with
the "bill of peace." A creature of equity, the bill of peace allowed a rep-
resentative of a group of similarly injured persons to bring suit on behalf
of absent class members as well as herself. Today, although it is avail-
able in actions at law, the class action remains an equitable device and
enjoys equity's flexible approach to remedies. 15
When a number of consumers has been harmed similarly by a de-
fendant, especially when the economic injury to each plaintiff is small, a
consumer class action is often the most effective device for recovering
damages and deterring the defendant from continuing the unlawful prac-
tice. 16 Consumer class actions make it feasible to bring claims that, indi-
cy pres distribution mechanisms. See Reader v. Magna-Superior Copper Co., 110 Auiz. 115,
116-17, 15 P.2d 860, 861-62 (1973); Schimmel v. Reed, 50 A.D.2d 1085, 1086, 377 N.Y.S.2d
313, 314 (1975), aff'd, 40 N.Y.2d 887, 357 N.E.2d 1016, 389 N.Y.S.2d 361 (1976).
15. D. DOBBs, REMEDIES § 2.1 (1973); J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.1, at 723 (1985); see also Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1940)
("The class suit was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where the
number of those interests in the subject of the litigation is so great that their joinder as parties
in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is impracticable.").
16. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 807-08, 484 P.2d 964, 968-69, 94
Cal. Rptr. 796, 800-01 (1971):
Frequently numerous consumers are exposed to the same dubious practice by
the same seller so that proof of the prevalence of the practice as to one consumer
would provide proof for all. Individual actions by each of the defrauded consumers
is often impracticable because the amount of individual recovery would be insuffi-
cient to justify bringing a separate action; thus an unscrupulous seller retains the
benefits of its wrongful conduct. A class action by consumers produces several salu-
tary by-products, including a therapeutic effect upon those sellers who indulge in
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vidually, might cost more to litigate than the amount of possible
recovery. Consumer class actions also conserve judicial resources by
avoiding multiple suits by individual consumers against the same defend-
ant,' 7 and they may also allow a defendant to assert res judicata against
subsequent claims by class members.'
8
Although federal and state class action statutes vary, they all follow
a general procedural pattern. The court first must determine whether
the class is eligible for certification. Once the class is certified, the court
must oversee notification of the absent class members, determine the de-
fendant's liability, 19 assess damages, and decide how the recovery will be
distributed. 20 If the class action is settled after certification, the court
must approve the settlement.21
B. Consumer Class Actions in Federal Court
For a class action to be certified under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23, four prerequisites must be met.22 In addition, the action must
be classified as one of three types described in Rule 23(b).23 When a
consumer class seeks damages from the defendant, it brings a class action
fraudulent practices, aid to legitimate business enterprises by curtailing illegitimate
competition, and avoidance to the judicial process of the burden of multiple litigation
involving identical claims.
17. Of course, class members who opt out can bring their own claims against the defend-
ant. Opting out is unlikely, however, when individual claims are so small that they do not
warrant individual suits.
18. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 367 (1921) ("If the federal courts
are to have the jurisdiction in class suits to which they are obviously entitled, the decree when
rendered must bind all of the class properly represented."). Res judicata is not guaranteed the
defendant, however. The advisory committee's notes to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
show that the drafters of the 1966 amendments, in spite of their concern for res judicata,
recognized that a court cannot predetermine the res judicata effect of its judgment; it can only
be determined in a subsequent action. See Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 968
n.12, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381 n.12 (1975).
19. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that both the plaintiff class and the
defendants have waived any jury trial rights that may have been available.
20. When a cy pres distribution mechanism is employed, the question is whether only
individual claims will be paid, the entire fund will be used in a cy pres fashion, or a combina-
tion of the two will be used.
21. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
22. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) states:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if(1) the class is so numerous thatjoinder of all members is imprac-
ticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class.
23. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(1) pertains to actions in which individual adju-
dications could adversely affect the class or the defendant. Rule 23(b)(2) applies to parties
seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, while 23(b)(3) applies to parties seeking damages.
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under Rule 23(b)(3), and the court must find that a class action is "supe-
rior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy. ' 24 Such a finding requires that the court consider the
"difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class ac-
tion."'25 When the membership of a class is large or continuously chang-
ing-that is, "fluid"-or the individual damages are relatively small,
concerns about management difficulties in providing adequate notice to
class members and in distributing damages may lead a court to deny
certification. 26 While the possibility of employing a cy pres method of
distribution may be a deciding factor in convincing a state court that a
class action is manageable, 27 federal courts have taken a dim view of fluid
recovery, beginning with a vehement Second Circuit decision, Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen 11I).28 However, one critic of cy pres con-
cedes that "without this innovation [cy pres distribution] some of the
more expansive class suits will have to be rejected as inherently unman-
ageable. As a result, some legally cognizable injuries, which may be
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
25. Id. 23(b)(3)(D).
26. See Turoff v. Union Oil Co., 61 F.R.D. 51, 54 (N.D. Ohio 1973) ("[Ihe cost of
administering the recovery in a given case compared with the size of the recovery may be
considered by the Court in determining whether a class action would be superior."). But see
Kohn & Kaplan, The Antitrust Class Suit: A Manageable Instrument for Social Justice, 41
ANTITRUST L.J. 292, 298 (1972) ("To fail to certify a class because some claimants may not
come forward, likewise permits defendants to retain all of their ill gotten profits. It defeats the
very deterrent goal that has led the Supreme Court to characterize the private suit as a 'bul-
wark of antitrust enforcement.' ") (quoting Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968)).
Judge Miles W. Lord, in In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotics Antitrust
Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), stated:
Difficulties in management are of significance only if they make the class action a less
'fair and efficient' method of adjudication than other available techniques. This per-
spective is particularly important... where the defendants, after reciting potential
manageability problems, seem to conclude that no remedy is better than an imperfect
one.
Id. at 282 (emphasis in original); see also Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 381,
389 n.3, 556 P.2d 755, 761 n.3, 134 Cal. Rptr. 393, 399 n.3 (1976) (Tobriner, J., concurring):
No class action is inherently unmanageable; a court always has access to a variety of
techniques, for example, for reducing the costs of giving notice to class members or
for distributing relief. The critical question.., is whether the techniques necessary
to render a class action manageable are unconstitutional, or so distort the values a
particular cause of action is meant to further that class suit would be improper.
27. See 3 H. NEWBERO, supra note 1, § 13.45, at 87-89.
28. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); see also
Windham v. American Brands, 565 F.2d 59, 72 (4th Cir. 1977) (following Eisen III, disal-
lowed aggregation of damages, referred to as "fluid recovery"); In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500
F.2d 86, 89-90 (9th Cir. 1974) (following Eisen III); In re Indus. Gas Antitrust Litig., 100
F.R.D. 280, 301 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (any form of fluid recovery held to be improper under the
Clayton Antitrust Act).
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small individually, but large in the aggregate, will go uncompensated.'
'29
C. Consumer Class Actions in California
Under California law, consumers may bring class actions in three
ways. California's pithy class action statute states that "when the ques-
tion is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or when the
parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the
court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all."'30 Apart
from this statute, a class may bring suit under the Consumers Legal
Remedy Act.3' The California Supreme Court has suggested use of this
Act's procedural provisions to simplify class action litigation in the inter-
ests of efficiency. 32 The third option is to bring a representative action
under the unfair competition and false advertising laws.33
The California judiciary looks much more kindly upon class actions
than do the federal courts.34 California courts are more sympathetic to
plaintiffs' interests than are federal courts in approaching the problem of
providing adequate notice to class members, 35 even allowing the courts
to require that the defendant pay all or part of notification costs. 36 In-
29. Handler, supra note 11, at 41.
30. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 382 (West 1973).
31. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 1985). The four prerequisites to certification
are very similar to those of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a):
The court shall permit the suit to be maintained on behalf of all members of the
represented class if all of the following conditions exist:
1) It is impracticable to bring all members of the class before the court.
2) The questions of law or fact common to the class are substantially similar and
predominate over the questions affecting the individual members.
3) The claims or defenses of the representative plaintiffs are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class.
4) The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.
Id. § 1781(b).
32. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 820, 484 P.2d 964, 977, 94 Cal. Rptr. 796,
809 (1971).
33. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17208, 17500-17560 (West 1964 & Supp. 1986).
34. Cartt v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 970 n.17, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376, 383 n.17
(1975) ("The apparent federal distaste for consumer class actions is not reflected in Califor-
nia."); see also Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 808-09, 484 P.2d 964, 968-69, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796, 800-01 (1971) (discussing the importance of class actions as a tool for the injured
consumer).
35. The United States Supreme Court has held that under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23(b)(3) plaintiffs must provide notice to every class member identifiable through reason-
able effort. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173 (1974). California courts require
individual notice only when class members have a substantial claim and allow notice by publi-
cation when the class is very large and the damages are small. See 48 CAL. JUR. 3D Parties
§ 42 (1979).
36. The Consumers Legal Remedies Act states that the court
may direct either party to notify each member of the class of the action. The party
required to serve notice may, . . . if personal notification is unreasonably expensive or
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deed, the California Supreme Court has called the consumer class action
"an essential tool for the protection of consumers against exploitative
business practices.
'37
The California Supreme Court has advised trial courts to use the
class action procedures of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as con-
structional aids if state authority is not controlling.3 8 In Cartt v. Superior
Court,
39 however, a California appellate court noted that although the
California Supreme Court "has repeatedly referred to Rule 23 as a useful
tool it has never adopted it as a procedural straitjacket. To the contrary,
trial courts [have] been urged to exercise pragmatism and flexibility in
dealing with class actions." 40 It is this "pragmatism and flexibility" that
has led California courts to be largely sympathetic to class actions
brought on behalf of consumers.
41
D. Assessment of Damages
After determining liability, both federal and California courts gener-
ally assess damages in one of two ways. The first method is the tradi-
tional trial in which each class member's damage claim is tried
separately. 42 Such proceedings are likely to place a severe burden on the
time and resources of both the court and the defendant when the class
size is great and the amount of damages is small.43 In addition, the time
and expense of individual trials can deter plaintiffs from pursuing small
damage claims.
The second alternative for assessing damages involves aggregating
the claims of all class members.44 This method not only eases judicial
it appears that all members of the class cannot be notified personally, give notice as
prescribed herein by publication ... in a newspaper of general circulation in the
county in which the transaction occurred.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781(d) (West 1985).
37. State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 471, 715 P.2d 564, 570, 224 Cal. Rptr.
605, 611 (1986).
38. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 821, 484 P.2d 964, 977-78, 94 Cal. Rptr.
796, 809-10 ("In the event of a hiatus, rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
prescribes procedural devices which a trial court may find useful.") (citing Daar v. Yellow Cab
Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 709, 433 P.2d 732, 742-43, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 734-35 (1967)); 48 CAL JUR.
3D Parties § 41 (1979).
39. 50 Cal. App. 3d 960, 124 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975).
40. Id. at 970 n.16, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 383 n.16 (citations omitted).
41. See Berk, supra note 6, at 651 ("Mr. Justice Sullivan's opinion in Daar v. Yellow Cab
Co. may be identified as signaling the advent of the large consumer class action in California.")
(footnotes omitted).
42. 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 9.53, at 320 n.361.
43. See, eg., In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500 F. 2d 86, 89 (9th Cir. 1974) (class consisted of
40 million persons who patronized various hotels that allegedly conspired to fix prices; proof of
individual claims would take "approximately one hundred years" even if only 10% of the
claimants came forward and used only 10 minutes per individual claim hearing).
44. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 16.5, at 747 & n.32.
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management of the class action by eliminating individual damage trials,
but also deters future unlawful conduct and ensures that the defendant
does not retain unlawfully gained profits.
45
After collecting the lump sum, the court can decide to distribute the
funds in two different ways. First, the court can distribute the entire sum
by dividing it among all the claimants (claimant fund-sharing), by reduc-
ing the price of the defendant's goods or services until the sum is "dis-
gorged" (price reduction), by allowing the funds to escheat to the state,
or by using a consumer trust fund. The second method of distributing
the aggregate sum collected on behalf of the consumer class is to pay
individual claims submitted by class members, and to place any residual
funds in the hands of trustees (the consumer trust fund) or allow them to
escheat to the government.
The next section of this Note examines the arguments for and
against the use of the cy pres doctrine in damage distribution. It then
discusses the various mechanisms that have emerged to cope with the
problem of residual funds or aggregate sums of small recoveries.
II. Cy Pres Distribution Mechanisms
A. Overview
In the context of consumer class actions, the cy pres doctrine per-
mits the "next best" use of settlement or damage funds that cannot feasi-
bly be distributed to individual plaintiffs. As noted, distribution
problems may arise when plaintiffs cannot be located or fail to submit
claims, or when the costs of distribution exceed or reduce to a pittance
the amount of recovery per individual plaintiff. Four cy pres distribution
mechanisms are discussed in detail below. Before examining these mech-
anisms, this subsection provides a history of cy pres in the context of
damages distribution, and the arguments for and against its application
in the context of class actions.
(1) California Courts
California courts have been in the vanguard in applying cy pres dis-
Critics of claims aggregation view the procedure as a violation of defendants' due process
rights. See infra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
45. To determine the aggregate amount of class members' damages, the courts may rely
upon the defendant's business records, J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note
15, § 16.5, at 747 & n.32, or upon a formula used to calculate the total damages suffered by the
class. In either case, a lump sum is collected on behalf of the class. See Devidian v. Automo-
tive Serv. Dealers Ass'n, 35 Cal. App. 3d 978, 982-83, 111 Cal. Rptr. 228, 230-32 (1973); see
also In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotics Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 278,
281 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (Judge Lord stated that "[ilt is far simpler to prove the amount of dam-
age to the members of the class by establishing their total damages than by collecting and
aggregating individual claims as a sum to be assessed against the defendants.").
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tribution mechanisms.46 The earliest case to apply the "next best" rea-
soning, although not a class action, was the California Supreme Court's
decision in Market Street Railway v. Railroad Commission.47 In that
case, transit overcharges that could not be distributed to injured parties
were awarded to the City and County of San Francisco to help finance
repairs to the railway, which the city recently had acquired. Despite the
state's escheat claim to the fund, the court chose the cy pres remedy
because it would indirectly benefit all railroad users who had paid the
excessive fares. 48 The court declared that it had the "duty and responsi-
bility.., to use broad discretion" in using the fund "to avoid an unlawful
or unjust result."
'49
In another non-class action applying the Market Street Railway rea-
soning, Olson v. County of Sacramento,50 a California appellate court
stated that if it was "impractical to distribute any recovery" to persons
who had paid for refuse collection under a void contract, the money
could "be used in other respects for the benefit of the county's
householders."
5
In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,52 a California trial court approved a set-
tlement designed to redistribute alleged overcharges of taxicab fares by
lowering fares for the benefit of future riders.5 3 The class was "fluid"
because there was no direct correlation between taxicab users who would
benefit from the reduced fares and those who were injured by the
overcharges. Thus, California courts began to recognize the idea of using
settlement monies or unclaimed damages funds for the "next best" use of
the injured class. Finally, in State v. Levi Strauss & Co. ,4 the California
Supreme Court endorsed the concept of cy pres distribution mechanisms
and drafted its opinion "as a source of guidance" for trial courts in their
discretionary application of these mechanisms. 55
(2) Federal Courts
While California courts generally have supported the use of cy pres,
federal courts have been less enthusiastic. The most serious attack in the
federal courts on the cy pres concept was the Second Circuit's 1973 deci-
46. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 16.5, at 747.
47. 28 Cal. 2d 363, 171 P.2d 875, cert denied, 329 U.S. 793 (1946).
48. Id. at 371-73, 171 P.2d at 880-82.
49. Id. at 367, 171 P.2d at 878 (citing United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 194
(1939)).
50. 274 Cal. App. 2d 316, 79 Cal. Rptr. 140 (1969).
51. Id. at 326, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
52. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
53. For an excellent summary of the Daar settlement, see Berk, supra note 6, at 651-52
n.5. The settlement is not discussed in the court's opinion.
54. 41 Cal. 3d 460, 715 P.2d 564, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1986).
55. Id. at 479, 715 P.2d at 576, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
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sion in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (Eisen 111).56 The Eisen litigation
was brought on behalf of purchasers and sellers of odd-lot shares of stock
on the New York Stock Exchange. The suit alleged a conspiracy to mo-
nopolize odd-lot trading to fix the odd-lot price differential in violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. 57 The district court dismissed the action
and, on appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded. 58 On re-
mand, the district court determined that the suit was manageable, that if
liability were established an aggregate damage fund could be assessed,
and that excess funds could be distributed by reducing profits on future
odd-lot transactions until the illegal profits were disgorged.5 9 On appeal,
the Eisen II1 court held price reduction to be improper and, in dictum,
found it to be a violation of due process.60 The United States Supreme
Court, in Eisen IV, declined to rule on the legality of price reduction.
61
Although the Eisen III decision has been roundly criticized, 62 the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits have relied on it to disallow cy pres distribu-
56. 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
57. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982).
58. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968) (Eisen 11).
59. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
60. Eisen 11I, 479 F.2d at 1018.
61. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 n.10 (1974). For a good history of
the cases up to Eisen III, see Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin, 87 HARV. L. REV. 426, 428-33 (1973).
62. E.g., Eisen 111, 479 F.2d at 1022 (Oakes, J., dissenting) ("The panel opinion ...
give[s] a green light to monopolies and conglomerates who deal in quantity items selling at
small prices to proceed to violate the antitrust laws, unhampered by any realistic threat of
private consumer civil proceedings .... "); Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120,
128, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346 (1981) ("Eisen and its progeny are not persuasive."); 2 H. NEW-
BERG, supra note 1, § 10.22, at 385-86 (Eisen III's rejection of cy pres as an unlawful windfall
"was in effect a ruling that it was better for the class to receive no compensation than to receive
imperfect compensation because benefits to third-party strangers could not be avoided. This
rationale is defective and is inconsistent with the historic purposes of class action remedies.");
Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Sub-
stance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 873-74 (1974) (discussing the court's lack
of clarity); McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure
and Substance-Class Action Issues, 25 HASTINGs L.J. 1351, 1403-04 (1974) (describing the
court's rationale as "unenlightening," and the asserted constitutional violation a "fiction");
Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1319, 1533 (1976) ("Eisen III
failed to provide a convincing basis for rejecting ... fluid distribution in antitrust class ac-
tions.") [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; Note, Fluid Recovery, supra note 3, at 120
(criticizing the Eisen III court's rejection of precedent); Note, supra note 61, at 451 ("The
above considerations suggest that the Eisen III court was incorrect in holding that the fluid
recovery... was not authorized by rule 23 .... ); Note, Due Process and Fluid Recovery, 53
OR. L. REv. 225, 232 (1974) ("Without citing any cases or making any argument, the court
characterized fluid recovery as [unconstitutional]."); Case Note, Class Actions-Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure-Stringent Notice Requirement and Rejection of the Fluid Class Recovery
Severely Limit Utility of the Class Action, 27 RUTGERS L. REV. 212, 213 ("The Eisen HI
decision represents a direct repudiation of the theory that Rule 23 was amended to encourage
and facilitate consumer class actions.").
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tion.63 Although federal courts impose more barriers to bringing con-
sumer class actions than the California courts,64 cy pres distribution
mechanisms can be useful at least in the context of settlements of federal
cases. 65 Cy pres remains a useful tool for consumer class actions in the
generally more hospitable environment of state courts, although it is
most commonly used in the distribution of settlement funds.
6
B. Benefits of Cy Pres Distribution Mechanisms
The primary benefit of cy pres distribution mechanisms is their po-
tential for serving three fundamental goals. First, the entire amount re-
covered can be distributed, leaving nothing to revert to the defendant.
Full distribution of the recovery satisfies the policy of disgorging illegally
obtained profits.67 Second, courts are more likely to certify class actions
and allow them to go forward on the merits when such mechanisms are
available, because they make the distribution of funds a manageable task.
The likelihood of class certification, coupled with disgorgement of all ille-
gally obtained profits, provides a deterrent to defendants contemplating
unlawful conduct. Finally, the cy pres doctrine provides compensation
to the maximum number of class members by the nature of its "next
best" application.
63. E.g., Windham v. American Brands, Inc., 565 F.2d 59, 72 & n.41 (4th Cir. 1977)
(price fixing), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 968 (1978); Kline v. Coldwell Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226,
233-34 (9th Cir. 1974) (same), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); In re Hotel Tel. Charges, 500
F.2d 86, 90 (9th Cir. 1974) (unlawful overcharges).
64. The Eisen IV Court required individual notice in Rule 23(b)(3) actions. 417 U.S. at
173. Snyder v. Harris disallowed the aggregation of claims for diversity jurisdiction, requiring
that each 23(b)(3) class member satisfy the $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. 394
U.S. 332, 339-42 (1969). The Snyder limitation does not affect class actions arising under
federal law. See Malina, supra note 11, at 492-93.
65. E.g., In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litig., 557 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd,
744 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); In re Three Mile Island
Litig., 557 F. Supp. 96 (M.D. Pa. 1982); West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
66. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 16.5, at 747-48.
67. Thus, the cy pres mechanism effectively serves a purpose similar to that of a construc-
tive trust. A constructive trust is imposed on one who has unlawfully acquired the property of
another, and requires that the property be removed from her possession. See generally 76 AM.
JUR. 2D Trusts § 221 (1975), which states:
A constructive trust ... is a trust by operation of law which arises ... against one
who, by fraud, actual or constructive .... by commission of wrong, or by any form of
unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any
way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right
to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy. It is
raised by equity to satisfy the demands of justice.
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C. Criticisms of Cy Pres Distribution Mechanisms
Despite the benefits of cy pres distribution mechanisms, they have
been criticized on various grounds. These criticisms are examined below.
(1) Windfall
The Eisen III court argued that cy pres distribution mechanisms
provide a windfall to third parties. 68 The court pointed out that if the
price of odd-lot securities on the stock exchange were lowered until ille-
gal profits were disgorged, new traders who entered the market after the
price-fixing violations occurred would receive the lower price and, there-
fore, a windfall.69 One commentator criticized this reasoning, pointing
out that the Eisen III court found it better for the class "to receive no
compensation than to receive imperfect compensation because benefits to
third-party strangers could not be avoided." 70 Clearly, windfall is inevi-
table in a cy pres distribution of damages or settlement funds. The true
question, then, is whether the undesirability of a windfall to third parties
is outweighed by the positive effects of cy pres distribution.
Windfalls are hardly taboo in the law. Indeed, the traditional appli-
cation of the cy pres doctrine to frustrated testamentary intent may result
in some windfall to beneficiaries who were not included in the testator's
original plan. Examples of accepted remedies that entail windfalls are
injunctions, 71 statutory minimum damages, 72 liquidated or treble dam-
ages, 73 punitive damages,74 shareholder derivative suits, 7 5 suits by whole-
salers who have passed on the costs of overcharges, 76 and actions under
the Cost of Living Stabilization Act of 1970.7 7 The principle common to
each of these areas is that some degree of windfall is a tolerable cost of
effectuating the deterrent purposes of the applicable laws and ensuring
recovery to victims who have actually been injured.
68. 479 F.2d 1005, 1010 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
Although the Eisen III court referred only to fluid recovery (called "price reduction" in this
Note), its criticisms are applicable to all cy pres distribution mechanisms and will be discussed
in this broader context.
69. Id. at 1010-11.
70. 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 10.22, at 385. Newberg further notes that "[tfhis
rationale is defective and is inconsistent with the historic purposes of class action remedies."
Id.
71. Note, supra note 61, at 450.
72. 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 10.22, at 386.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Note, The Cy Pres Solution, supra note 3, at 916 (windfall occurs when damages go to
current shareholders, some of whom did not own stock at the time of the violation).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 916, 919 & n.166 (Pub. L. No. 91-379, tit. II, §§ 201-206, 84 Stat. 796 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1980) (authorizing the President to reduce prices "as may be
necessary to prevent gross inequities")).
Wholesale prohibition of windfall in class action recoveries would
leave a court with three alternatives: fund-sharing among the identifiable
claimants, allowing the funds to revert to the defendant, or dismissing
the suit. The first option does not solve the problem because it merely
shifts the windfall from third parties to class members who submit
claims. The other alternatives will allow the defendant to retain its ille-
gally obtained profits and thus constitute windfalls in themselves. More-
over, these alternatives do little to redress the legitimate grievances of
class members or to effectuate the purposes of consumer protection
laws.78 As one commentator has pointed out, "it is unclear what policy
is served by striking down a remedy which may be the only effective way
to vindicate the rights of plaintiff class members, simply because it also
benefits third parties. '7
9
Thus, in light of the alternatives, the third-party windfalls produced
by cy pres distribution mechanisms represent an "incidental but neces-
sary cost" of enforcing laws that protect class members.80 Furthermore,
courts can ensure that the cost truly remains "incidental" by tailoring
the distribution to the circumstances of a particular case. One commen-
tator has suggested that the appropriate standard for determining if
windfall is acceptable in a particular case is that there be a "reasonable
overlap" between the injured class and those benefiting from the cy pres
use of the funds.81 This standard poses no problem if courts and attor-
neys who contemplate using cy pres distribution mechanisms appreciate
the meaning and intent of the cy pres concept: to apply the funds to the
next best class, attempting to parallel the intended use of the funds as
nearly as possible.
(2) Equitable Power of the Court Under Rule 23
The Second Circuit voiced another concern in Eisen III, centering
78. See 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 10.22, at 386; see also Note, The Cy Pres Solu-
tion, supra note 3, at 902 ("Such unjust enrichment is contended to be both inconsistent with
the legislative objective [of antitrust and securities laws] ... and a limitation upon the class
action remedy inconsistent with the equitable origins of class actions.").
79. Note, supra note 61, at 450.
80. Id. This rationale for allowing third-party recovery also applies to double recovery,
in which a plaintiff who has received individual damages also benefits from the cy pres distri-
bution of the remaining funds.
The California appellate court in Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 342 (1981), found that cy pres damage distribution can exist harmoniously with the
policy against third-party recovery embodied in California's antitrust statute, the Cartwright
Act, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16703 (West 1964). The court conceded that damage
recovery by an uninjured party is contrary to the Act, but held that the recovery of a judgment
differs from the distribution of funds from that recovery. 127 Cal. App. 3d at 130-31, 179 Cal.
Rptr. at 347-48. Thus, third-party benefits resulting from the distribution of legitimately re-
covered damages would not violate the antitrust statute.
81. 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 10.22, at 385-86.
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on the court's power to authorize a cy pres remedy. While acknowledg-
ing the need for consumer protection and sanctions against illegally oper-
ated businesses, the Eisen III court stated that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 did not authorize it to provide a cy pres remedy.
82
Rule 23, however, is silent on the issue of remedies or a court's re-
medial power, and several courts have been undaunted by the constraint
which the Eisen III court perceived. In West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer &
Co.,83 the federal district court acknowledged that it had the power to
adopt cy pres mechanisms and "should exercise its equitable control over
these funds for the benefit of all consumers."' 84 Similarly, the federal dis-
trict court in Bebchick v. Public Utilities Commission85 fashioned a cy
pres remedy because it was a "judgment appropriate to carry out the
opinion."8
6
Federal courts also may rely on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
54(c) to fashion equitable remedies when plaintiffs are entitled to equita-
ble relief.8 7 In In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation,88 the federal dis-
trict court stated that "it is well recognized that the administration of
class actions... will present novel and unanticipated administrative diffi-
culties. We are admonished to respond with flexibility and imagination.
That admonition reflects in part the equitable origin of the class action
device, a setting characterized by innovation consistent with settled prin-
ciples." 89 The California courts, as longtime supporters of cy pres mecha-
nisms, have been more willing than the federal courts to exercise their
authority to administer cy pres remedies.90
(3) Federal Statutory and Constitutional Challenges
The Eisen III court's reluctance to permit cy pres distribution was
based in part on concerns over due process and the fundamental legality
of the class action procedure invoked on behalf of a fluid class. 91 These
concerns implicate the interests of both plaintiffs and defendants, and the
82. 479 F.2d 1005, 1018 (2d Cir. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
83. 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 871 (1971).
84. Id. at 728 (quoting with approval "the Alabama Plan" for distribution of funds, pro-
posed by plaintiffs and adopted by defendants).
85. 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963).
86. Id. at 203.
87. See Note, supra note 61, at 447 & n.120. Except for a default judgment, "every final
judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even
if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c).
88. 557 F. Supp. 1091 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 774 F.2d 1252 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. dis-
missed, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
89. Id. at 1104 (citations omitted).
90. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
91. 479 F.2d at 1013-18.
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resolution of such issues should properly avoid a narrow focus on one
group or the other, but should balance all interests to ensure a just result.
In Eisen, the trial court admitted that identifying and notifying all
class members would be impossible, but asserted that if liability were
established it could assess damages based on the average odd-lot differen-
tial charged by the defendant. Individual investors who had paid the
differential would be allowed to file claims and recover individual judg-
ments, and the court could order that the remaining undistributed funds
be applied to reduce odd-lot commissions on future transactions.92 Wil-
liam Simon offered a summary of the objectionable features of this
scheme:
[Many of the members of the "fluid class" benefitting from the judg-
ment-the odd-lot purchasers in the late 1970's who made no
purchases in the early 1960's-would be people who had not been in-
jured by the alleged violation. Others-those who purchased in both
periods and proved claims-would be compensated twice. And many
who were in fact damaged during the complaint period would receive
nothing.
The effect of [this scheme] is to legislate a shift in private antitrust
policy from compensation to confiscation....
Thus, the courts are using a procedural rule to effect changes in
substantive law. This is directly contrary to the Enabling Act under
which the Rules were promulgated, which provides that rules pro-
scribed [sic] by the Supreme Court for the District Courts "shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."...
Other serious constitutional questions are raised by the ... use of
separate trials for liability and damages, [which,] either before separate
juries or with damages decided by a master, violates defendants' due
process rights .... Eisen . . ., in the interests of expediency, would
wholly eliminate defendants' rights to challenge claimants['] proof of
damages.
93
The Eisen III court rested its disallowance of the cy pres scheme on very
similar grounds; however, such reasoning is distorted because it focuses
almost exclusively on defendants' interests, in derogation of the interests
92. The Eisen III court stated that
it was highly improbable that any great number of claims would, for a variety of
reasons, ultimately be filed by the 6,000,000 members of the class. No claimant in
the 6 years of the progress of the action had shown any interest in Eisen's claim. The
average odd-lot differential on each transaction had been $5.18. The average individ-
ual class member engaging in five transactions would have paid a total odd-lot differ-
ential of $25.90. Assuming a 5% illegal overcharge the recovery is approximately
$1.30, and when trebled the average class member would be entitled to damages of
$3.90. As the costs of administration might run into the millions of dollars, it was
not likely that a rush of claimants would eventuate no matter how extensive the
publication.
Id. at 1010.
93. Simon, Class Actions-Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 385-86
(1973) (footnotes omitted).
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of plaintiffs and the purposes which the class action procedure was
designed to serve.
a. The Enabling Act Claim
Critics of cy pres distribution such as Simon contend that such
mechanisms effect a policy change "from compensation to confiscation."
The shift occurs because defendants are required to pay damages not to
individual aggrieved plaintiffs but to a large class that probably includes
some members who are not actually injured. The critics charge that this
policy shift alters substantive rights in violation of the Rules Enabling
Act, under which Rule 23 was promulgated.
94
The rationale of cy pres distribution, however, demonstrates that the
underlying policy of substantive law is not changed. The cy pres doc-
trine will be invoked when direct compensation to identifiable class mem-
bers is not possible or is impractical, and its object is to compensate the
"next best" class that can be ascertained under the circumstances of a
particular case. The policy of compensation is undisturbed, and it is bet-
ter advanced by conferring benefits on the "next best" class than by per-
mitting the defendant to retain profits that it procured in violation of the
substantive statutes from which the policy derives.
Moreover, it is questionable whether a remedial device such as cy
pres distribution can be considered to affect substantive rights. The dis-
tinction between substantive and procedural rules has been most squarely
confronted in cases involving conflicts between state and federal rules of
procedure after Erie Railroad v. Tompkins.95 The Supreme Court has
refused to draw this distinction "by application of any automatic, 'litmus
paper' criterion," but has rather looked to the policies underlying the
source of the conflict.96 In this regard, John Hart Ely has suggested that
a substantive right is one "granted for one or more nonprocedural rea-
sons, for some purpose or purposes not having to do with the fairness or
efficiency of the litigation process."' 97 Class actions involving cy pres dis-
tribution mechanisms are uniquely concerned with the fairness and effi-
ciency of enforcing the substantive rights of plaintiffs who would
otherwise be left without an appropriate remedy and should not be con-
sidered to offend the Enabling Act.
b. Due Process Concerns
Defendants' due process objections lie in the aggregation of claims
from a fluid class, a practice which has been attacked because it deprives
94. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
95. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
96. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965). The source of the conflict in Hanna was',
of course, the choice-of-law rule laid down in Erie.
97. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 725 (1974).
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defendants of their right to contest damages ascertained from individual
claims and because "average awards erode due process." 98 That is, de-
fendants should not be compelled to litigate damages allegedly sustained
by unidentified class members. However, by focusing exclusively on the
interests of defendants, this contention threatens the very purposes which
the class action procedure was intended to serve. 99
Clearly, Rule 23 contemplates that some class actions will go for-
ward even though some members of the class remain unidentified, since it
does not uniformly require actual notice to potential plaintiffs but per-
mits "the best notice practicable under the circumstances." The
problems that the notice requirement creates for a large plaintiff class are
beyond the scope of this Note,'00 but it is sufficient to observe here that
the requirement is imposed to protect the due process rights of potential
plaintiffs who may be bound by the judgment or subject to liability for
counterclaims asserted by the defendant. 0 1 The defendant's due process
interest in the identification of potential class members relates to proof of
damages rather than more fundamental concerns of procedural fairness.
As with all problems of proof, the issue of fairness must be deter-
mined by considering all the circumstances in a particular case. In the
context of consumer class actions, the best possible proof of damages will
come from the defendant, whose business records often provide the most
reliable source of information concerning its activities.10 2 Requiring in-
dividuals, whose damages will often be relatively slight, to come forward
with their individual claims would frustrate Rule 23's purpose-recog-
nized by the Eisen II court---of providing "small claimants with a
method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too
small to warrant individual litigation."10 3 Thus, a balanced presentation
98. Al Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 64 F.R.D. 43, 55 (D. Del. 1974)
(cy pres rejected in treble damage antitrust case); see supra text accompanying note 93.
99. The Eisen III court castigated proponents of cy pres distribution for using "colorful
language [that] stimulates the imagination, beguiles one into useful symbolism and opens up
the avenues of creative thought ... [but] almost always [produces] confusion of thought and
irrational, emotional and unsound decisions." Yet in setting out its due process concerns, the
court relied on its own purple prose, stating that "[ilt is a historical fact that procedural safe-
guards for the benefit of all litigants constitute some of the most important and salutary protec-
tions against oppressions." Eisen III, 479 F.2d at 1013.
100. See generally J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, supra note 15, § 16.6, at
749.
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 73 F.R.D. 322, 353 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("In
this litigation, defendants have maintained records and publicly have reported sales according
to classes of purchasers. Consequently, it is possible to develop accurate statistical information
of total sales to industrial and institutional users, wholesalers and retail grocers seeking class
certification.").
103. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968); see also FED. R. CIv.
P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's notes (individual class members' "interests may be theoretical
rather than practical: the class may have a high degree of cohesion and prosecution of the
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of the due process issue shows that litigating the damages of unidentified
class members threatens defendants with very little oppression or unfair-
ness, while foreclosing a fluid class threatens to leave a great many
wrongs without a remedy.
Moreover, cy pres distribution of damages, which may confer bene-
fits on individuals who were not actually injured by the defendant's con-
duct, is subject to no substantial due process challenge from a defendant.
If the class action otherwise affords due process throughout the proceed-
ings, the method of damage distribution should not alone be considered
to deprive the defendant of its constitutional rights. 10 4 Furthermore,
before a court can order class certification, it must determine that the
class members' claims are of a common nature.1 05 As Newberg states,
Just as an adverse decision against the class in the defendant's favor
will be binding against the entire class in the aggregate without any
rights of individual class members to litigate the common issues indi-
vidually, so, too, an aggregate monetary liability award for the class
will be binding on the defendant without offending due process.10 6
Indeed, the defendant who settles does not have an interest in how the
damages are distributed once the settlement terms are finalized, 107 and it
also is questionable whether the defendant even has an interest in the
distribution of court-determined damages. Under this distinction be-
tween "recovery" and "distribution,"10 8 due process considerations
would be relevant to the recovery of judgment, but not to the distribution
process. Outside the context of cy pres distribution, even the Second
Circuit, where Eisen I was decided, has since approved the aggregation
of damages. 109
In apportioned damages, plaintiffs' due process concerns arise when
individual recoveries are not paid and the entire fund is distributed by a
action through a representative would be quite unobjectionable, or the amounts at stake for
individuals may be so small that individual suits would be impractical.").
104. See Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 128-29, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342, 346
(1981).
105. See, eg., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) (requiring "questions of law or fact common to the
class").
106. 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 10.05, at 354-55 (citations omitted).
107. See In re Sugar Indus. Antitrust Litig., 73 F.R.D. 322, 353 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("Upon
the establishment of such aggregate damages as may be assessed against defendants, the prob-
lem of allocations among classes and distribution within each class largely becomes a plaintiffs'
problem, which should not militate against certification of these classes"); Malina, supra note
11, at 482 ("[S]ettling defendants have no interest in how the settlement fund is distributed, so
long as they are assured that no claims remain outstanding and that they receive the peace they
have paid for.").
108. Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 130-31, 179 Cal. Rptr. 342, 347-48
(1981); see supra note 80.
109. Van Gemert v. Boeing Co., 553 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 1977).
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cy pres method.' 10 The concern is that plaintiffs who might otherwise
have brought individual suits and claimed their damages are now bound
by the representative's decision to apply the entire fund to a cy pres dis-
tribution mechanism. This argument also applies when the residual
funds are used in a cy pres fashion after payment of individual claims, if
there are other, unidentified individuals who may have damage claims.II
In such cases, however, the procedural difficulties in distributing in-
dividual damages must be weighed against the overall benefits of the class
action. In all class actions, plaintiffs are given a chance to opt out of the
class and pursue their own remedies. 112 By becoming class members,
plaintiffs tacitly acquiesce-albeit in advance-in the decisions of the
class representative. Furthermore, if the court considers the individual
claims to be substantial, it may require payment of individual claims and
apply a cy pres mechanism only to residual funds. If individual claims
are so insubstantial that a court would approve a cy pres distribution of
the entire fund, it is highly unlikely that an individual plaintiff would
have brought her own suit. As the dissenting judge in Eisen III stated,
"[a]ll that the due process clause requires is a procedure that 'fairly in-
sures the protection of the interests of absent parties who are to be bound
by [the judgment].' -113
When funds remain undistributed in a consumer class action but cy
pres distribution mechanisms are disallowed for due process reasons, two
unsatisfactory results are possible. First, the suit may not be brought at
all because of prohibitive management costs. Second, individual claim-
ants may receive only paltry refimds. The first result could render con-
sumer protection legislation nugatory; the second serves only partially
the purposes of disgorgement of unlawful profits and deterrence of future
unlawful behavior by the defendant. While the latter results have some
value, they are less than adequate, and even more valuable and lasting
results can be achieved by using the entire damage or settlement fund for
projects in the consumers' interests.
D. Alternatives to Cy Pres
Critics of cy pres distribution mechanisms have suggested a number
of alternatives to their use. These alternatives include allowing the undis-
tributed funds to revert to the defendant, reclassifying federal class ac-
tions brought for damages as actions for injunctions, and allowing a
110. Note, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy, 39 U. CM. L. REv.
448, 464 (1972).
111. Id.; see also Note, supra note 62, at 232-38 (discussing the relevance of due process to
notice requirements and adequate representation).
112. See supra note 17.
113. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1024 (2d Cir. 1973) (Oakes, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940)), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S.
156 (1974).
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congressionally created public body to handle large consumer class ac-
tions. Each of these alternatives is discussed below.
(1) Reversion
The first alternative to cy pres distribution is to return undistributed
funds to the defendant after all possible claims have been paid. In Van
Gemert v. Boeing Co.,114 unclaimed funds reverted to the defendant after
the Second Circuit denied a claimant fund-sharing proposal. In Kesten-
baum v. Emerson, an antifraud suit, the federal district court approved a
settlement with a provision that funds remaining after payment of claims
and expenses revert to the defendant.11 5 Proponents of reversion argue
that a failure to return undistributed funds to the defendant effects an
"unlawful forfeiture," and that if the funds are not going to be used for
direct compensation of the plaintiffs, they should revert to the
defendant. 116
This "unlawful forfeiture," however, can be viewed merely as a dis-
gorgement of illegally obtained profits, which prevents unjust enrichment
and serves the important function of deterrence.' 17 In SEC v. Golconda
Mining Co., 118 a securities fraud case, the federal district court stated
that "[t]o permit the return of the unclaimed funds, a portion of the illicit
profits, would impair the full impact of the deterrent force that is essen-
tial if adequate enforcement of the securities acts is to be achieved" and
that the "circumstance that some of the claimants cannot presently be
found does not justify turning back to [defendants] their ill- gotten prof-
its."' 19 The California Supreme Court has pointed out that, without cy
pres distribution mechanisms, "defendants may be permitted to retain ill-
gotten gains simply because their conduct harmed large numbers of peo-
ple in small amounts instead of small numbers of people in large
114. 553 F.2d 812, 815-16 (2d Cir. 1977) (class of nonconverting debenture holders
brought suit claiming insufficient notice for exercising conversion rights).
115. [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCII) 98,293 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). A
settlement might not include admission of wrongdoing by the defendant. The terms of the
settlement should determine the fate of unclaimed funds, however, and it is in the class mem-
bers' best interest that excess funds be used on their behalf rather than revert to the defendant.
116. See 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 10.24, at 390. Newberg disagrees, however,
relying upon the importance of deterrence.
117. Id. The court in In re Folding Carton Antitrust Litigation rejected the defendant's
equitable claim to the reserve fund "in light of the Sherman Act policy of deterrence and the
defendants' wrongdoing." 557 F. Supp. 1091, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 1983), aff'd, 744 F.2d 1252 (7th
Cir. 1984), cert dismissed, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985); see also Kohn & Kaplan, supra note 26, at
297 n.17 ("Division among the other claimants,. . . the 'floating class', and escheat, are three
obvious alternatives, each of which is in conformity with the law, and certainly morally prefer-
able to leaving the malefactor with his ill-gotten gain.").
118. 327 F. Supp. 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
119. Id. at 259 (footnotes omitted).
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amounts."' 120 Clearly, allowing undistributed funds to revert to the de-
fendant confers far fewer benefits than a scheme designed to compensate,
albeit indirectly, a "next best" class of consumers.
(2) Reclassification of Suits to Provide Injunctions
A second alternative to cy pres, mentioned by the Eisen III court, is
to avoid the problem of residual damages altogether by allowing courts
to reclassify Rule 23(b)(3) suits for damages as Rule 23(b)(2) suits for
injunctions. 121 The court reasoned that awards of attorney's fees would
remain as incentives to bringing class actions. However, when unlawful
gains remain in the defendant's hands, an injunction is simply inade-
quate.122 Neither the policy of disgorgement nor that of compensation is
advanced by this plan.
(3) Congressional Action
A third suggestion for avoiding the problem of undistributed funds
in consumer class actions, also noted in Eisen III, is for Congress to cre-
ate a "public body to do justice in the matter of consumers' claims in
such fashion as to afford compensation to the injured consumer," thereby
allowing Congress to decide how the money is spent. 123 In 1981, the
Department of Justice made a proposal to Congress to repeal Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) and replace it with a provision for
"class compensatory actions" and "public actions." 124 These controver-
sial proposals have not gathered substantial congressional support. Even
if an agency eventually is established, it seems inappropriate to require
taxpayers, rather than the defendant whose conduct is in question, to
fund the administrative costs.125
120. State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 472, 715 P.2d 564, 571, 224 Cal. Rptr.
605, 612 (1986).
121. Eisen 111, 479 F.2d 1005, 1019-20 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated on other grounds, 417 U.S.
156 (1974).
122. Injunctions may be appropriate in circumstances similar to those in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 381, 556 P.2d 755, 134 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1976) (small sales
tax overcharges already in state treasury and defendant held no unlawful gains).
123. Eisen III, 479 F.2d at 1019.
124. H.R. 13, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REc. 125 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1981). The
proposal provided that undistributed funds in public action cases could escheat to the govern-
ment to finance other public actions and enforcement of the new statute. The proposal was
widely debated and returned to the Department of Justice for redrafting. For discussion of
this proposal, see Mickum & Rhees, Federal Class Action Reform: A Response to the Proposed
Legislation, 79 Ky. L.J. 799 (1981).
Congress has, however, authorized the use of cy pres mechanisms for residual funds in the
context of parens patriae actions, in which a state brings suit on behalf of its citizens. 15
U.S.C. §§ 15c-15e (1982).
125. Although the agency eventually could become self-supporting, it is likely that tax
dollars would be spent at its inception.
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The dissenting judge in Eisen III criticized the "public body" sug-
gestion, calling it "an abdication of judicial responsibility." 126 The dis-
sent further stated that "[i]t is as much to say that the courts are
insufficiently inventive to be capable of handling a matter-the distribu-
tion of unlawfully obtained money to a large number of people. I doubt
this very much. I suspect that the courts can do the job."
127
None of these suggested methods of avoiding undistributed funds
adequately satisfies the goals of compensation of consumers, disgorge-
ment of illegally obtained profits, and deterrence of future misconduct.
Only a method that addresses all of these concerns will be truly effective
in the consumer class action context.
E. The Cy Pres Distribution Mechanisms
The literature on the cy pres doctrine in the context of class actions
recognizes four types of cy pres distribution mechanisms. The first three
options--escheat to the government, price reduction, and claimant fund-
sharing-are discussed in this subsection. The fourth option, the con-
sumer trust fund, is considered in the following subsection.
(1) Governmental Escheat
One method of distributing settlement and aggregate damage funds
is to allow the funds to escheat to the state.128 There are two forms of
governmental escheat. The court may direct that the funds be used for a
specific purpose ("earmarked" escheat) so that it benefits a group of per-
sons who approximate the injured class.'2 9 Alternatively, the money
may escheat unconditionally, to be deposited into the state treasury and
used at the government's discretion.
30
An advantage of the earmarked escheat mechanism is that it mini-
mizes distribution costs because the government has agencies in place
that are organized to manage programs beneficial to the public at large.
By disposing of the entire settlement fund or damages, earmarked es-
cheat also realizes the goals of disgorgement of illegal profits and deter-
126. 479 F.2d at 1024 (Oakes, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 1024-25.
128. Depending upon the state's escheat statute, such a disposition may be mandatory.
California recently revised its escheat statute to allow courts to make alternative dispositions of
unclaimed funds. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1519.5 (West 1982) ("[lIt is the intent of the Legis-
lature that nothing in this section shall be construed to change the authority of a court or
administrative agency to order equitable remedies.").
129. E.g., West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (portion
of settlement funds set aside for public health programs), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
130. The unclaimed-property law of a state would effectuate this result. For discussion of
unconditional escheat, see Note, Collecting Overcharges, supra note 3, at 1056-57; Note, supra
note 110, at 455-56; Developments in the Law, supra note 62, at 1523, 1527.
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rence of future illegal activities.'13 For example, in West Virginia v.
Chas. Pfizer & Co.,132 the court used earmarked escheat to allocate
residual funds of a $100 million settlement entered into by a number of
antibiotics manufacturers. The settlement fund was given to state gov-
ernments to be used for "public health purposes" and eventually financed
various projects, including treating drug addiction, instituting pollution
control programs, and informing the public of environmental pollution
laws. 133
The danger of earmarked escheat is that nothing prevents the gov-
ernment from diverting the earmarked funds away from the intended
purpose. 134 Similarly, if the funds are turned over to supplement an ex-
isting service, the government can simply reduce existing budget alloca-
tions proportionately rather than augment the original funding. 135 Thus,
although earmarked escheat serves the major purpose of keeping the
funds from reverting to the defendant, safeguards are needed to ensure
131. State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 474, 715 P.2d 564, 572, 224 Cal. Rptr.
605, 613 (1986). This is also a feature of the existing-organization type consumer trust fund.
For discussion, see infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text. See also 2 H. NEWBERG, supra
note 1, § 10.19, at 381; Note, supra note 110, at 455-56; Note, An Economic Analysis, supra
note 3, at 180; Developments in the Law, supra note 62, at 1527.
132. 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 871 (1971).
133. Id. at 728; see Report of Special Master Kissam on Claims of Institutions and the
Excess Consumer Fund at 11, Texas v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 68 Civ. 4375 M 19-93 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 24, 1973) (Texas' settlement fund divided among state health and education agencies
and state attorney general for educating public on pollution laws).
134. See Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 180 ("[T]he advantages of earmark-
ing the damage award are illusory. Nothing prevents the government from lowering its ex-
penditures on the designated project by the amount of the damage award and reallocating the
extra funds to other governmental projects."); see also Note, Collecting Overcharges, supra note
3, at 1049 ("[T]his money might serve only to replace existing budgets for energy purposes
.... ); Note, supra note 110, at 458 ("Except for insuring that the desired programs were
initiated, a cy pres solution allowing diversion of formerly budgeted funds would serve the
same general purpose as an unrestricted escheat to the state.").
135. See generally Note, supra note 110, at 458 & n.42; see also Note, Collecting
Overcharges, supra note 3, at 1056-57.
As an illustration, overcharges collected from major oil refiners that violated pricing and
allocation regulations were promised by President Carter to be used for low-income energy
needs. See id. at 1039-40. The Reagan Administration requested that the states turn over
their allocations of the overcharge fund to the federal government to reduce the federal budget
deficit. Although it can be argued that all Americans will benefit from a reduced federal
budget deficit, this application of the funds is a far cry from an attempt to address energy needs
of low-income consumers. According to a telephone conversation with the California Depart-
ment of Finance, Governor Deukmejian of California was the only state governor to support
this plan, which was ultimately rejected by Congress. But see State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41
Cal. 3d 460, 474 n.10, 715 P.2d 564, 572 n.10, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605, 613 n.10 (1986)
("[E]armarked escheats can be conditioned on the state's promise not to divert previously
budgeted funds. Though the court's ability to enforce such conditions may be limited, there is
no reason to assume that the state would act in bad faith.") (citation omitted).
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that this technique will satisfy cy pres notions of damage distribution.
The lack of control over governmental use of damages or settlement
funds threatens its effectiveness.
When funds escheat unconditionally to the state, the benefit to con-
sumers is so dispersed that it is likely to go unnoticed. While uncondi-
tional escheat serves the goals of disgorgement of illegal profits and
deterrence of wrongdoing, compensation of injured class members is
both remote and diffuse. In some instances, however, it may be more
efficient for the state to retain unlawful funds already in its possession,
rather than to allow a class action suit that seeks to compensate individ-
ual plaintiffs directly. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Superior Court,136 for ex-
ample, unlawfully assessed sales taxes were already in the state treasury.
The California Supreme Court determined that the expense and burden
of going forward with a class action outweighed the benefits of direct
recovery to the class and simply left the money with the government.
However, despite the ease of administration, the California Supreme
Court considers unconditional escheat to be the "least focused compen-
sation" to class members, to be regarded as a "last resort ... where a
more precise remedy cannot be found."
1 37
(2) Price Reduction
A second application of the cy pres doctrine to the problem of un-
distributed class action funds is the price reduction mechanism. 1
38
Under this approach, the price of a product or service is lowered until the
defendant has disgorged all illegally gained profits. This solution is use-
ful because the benefits of lower prices are bestowed on a similar,
although "fluid" class of plaintiffs.
Several courts have successfully applied the price reduction mecha-
136. 18 Cal. 3d 381, 556 P.2d 755, 134 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1976). In Blue Chip Stamps, the
court dismissed a class action in which the plaintiffs had alleged that excessive sales taxes had
been collected by a trading stamp company. The court rejected individual recovery on the
facts of the case, in part because the amount of individual damages was small and the
overcharges had been paid to the state treasury, benefiting state residents in general. Id. at
386-87, 556 P.2d at 758-59, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97.
137. State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460,475, 715 P.2d 564, 572-73, 224 Cal. Rptr.
605, 613-14 (1986).
138. See Bebchick v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 203-04 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam)
(revenues from improperly granted rate increase used to keep fares down on behalf of current
transit riders), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963). The Eisen III court declared this application
of cy pres distribution "illegal, inadmissible as a solution of the manageability problems of
class actions and wholly improper." 479 F.2d at 1018.
In his concurrence to Levi Strauss, Justice Grodin noted that price reduction is not actu-
ally a method of residue distribution, but an alternative to the creation of a residue. 41 Cal. 3d
460, 488 n.l, 715 P.2d 564, 582 n.1, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605, 623 n.1 (1986) (Grodin, J., concur-
ring). Although Justice Grodin is correct, price reduction is commonly discussed in the con-
text of cy pres distribution mechanisms.
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nism. In the California case of Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 139 settlement
funds were used to lower taxicab meter rates to disgorge the cab com-
pany's unlawful overcharges. 140 Similarly, the settlement of a federal dis-
trict court case, Colson v. Hilton Hotels Corp., provided for hotel room
rate reduction of fifty cents per day until the settlement funds were de-
pleted.141 Without acknowledging the concept of cy pres or price reduc-
tion, a federal district court, in the non-class action case of Oakland
Raiders v. Office of Emergency Preparedness,142 required that football
ticket overcharges be refunded to identifiable purchasers and that the re-
maining funds be disgorged by reducing the price of future tickets.
Despite the laudable intention behind this cy pres mechanism,
which is to reach as many uncompensated class members as possible, the
price reduction system of disgorging illegal profits presents several
problems. Uninjured plaintiffs who benefit from the price reduction re-
ceive windfalls, and injured plaintiffs who already have received their
share of the damage fund may enjoy double recovery if they also benefit
from the price reduction. 143 Some courts have rejected price reduction
after determining that too large a discrepancy between the class benefited
and the class harmed would result. 144
At least one commentator has objected to price reduction on eco-
nomic grounds. 14 5 Under this theory, if the price of the goods or services
is reduced, consumers will incur inconvenience costs in seeking the lower
price. Consumers who must expend more time and energy to acquire the
item (for example, by making a longer trip to a store that carries the
discounted item, and perhaps waiting in line to purchase it) ultimately
may benefit little from the reduced price.14 6 Furthermore, the defend-
ant's competitors may be affected adversely by the price decrease, partic-
139. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967).
140. The settlement is not discussed in the court's opinion. For a description of the settle-
ment, see Berk, supra note 6, at 651 n.5; Comment, supra note 3, at 366 n.186.
141. 59 F.R.D. 324, 327 (N.D. Il. 1972).
142. 380 F. Supp. 187, 190 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
143. In the Doar settlement, for example, some customers were reimbursed individually
based on the defendant's records. By additionally taking advantage of the reduced fares, these
customers could potentially recover more than their share. See supra text accompanying note
93.
144. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 72 (D.N.J. 1971)
(court ruled that the class to be benefited was sufficiently distinct from the injured class that
price reduction was inappropriate).
The overlap of injured and benefited consumers depends in part on the class of consumers
and the frequency with which they purchase the product or service. For example, purchasers
of "big ticket" items, such as automobiles or expensive household appliances, would be less
likely to benefit from a price reduction than users of a product or service purchased more
frequently. See Brief for Amici Curiae at 23-24, State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 42 Cal. 3d 460,
715 P.2d 564, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1986) (No. A015639) [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae].
145. Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 173.
146. Id. at 187.
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ularly if it forces them to lower their prices to compete with the
defendant's product or services. 147
It is also possible that an enterprising individual could purchase the
discounted goods and resell them at a higher rate, thus defeating the in-
tention to benefit consumers.1 48 The defendant also could reduce quality
or production levels to avoid incurring a loss of revenue, or the price
reduction could be so small that it would go unnoticed and not truly
benefit consumers. 49 Further, if the price of the product or service is
fixed by independent retailers rather than the defendant itself, monumen-
tal management problems arise in ensuring that the price reduction is
passed on to the consumer.150 In light of these objections, monopolies,
because they have no competitors, may be the only businesses in which
the price reduction mechanism can benefit consumers without harming
the market.' 5 ' Thus, the price reduction mechanism is of limited utility
in distributing settlement funds and damages to the next best class in
consumer class actions.
(3) Claimant Fund-Sharing
A third cy pres distribution mechanism is claimant fund-sharing,
which allows class members who submit claims to divide the entire set-
tlement or damage fund pro rata.152 Claimant fund-sharing leaves no res-
idue because the entire fund is distributed to claimants after deducting
expenses and attorney's fees. While this mechanism compensates all
claimants who submit legitimate claims, the inherent difficulties are read-
ily apparent. Class members who file claims will probably receive a
windfall since it is highly unlikely that all class members will come for-
ward.' 53 On the other hand, administrative costs may consume such a
large portion of the fund that individual recoveries are miniscule despite
147. Id. at 195.
148. Note, supra note 110, at 462.
149. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 144, at 23-24.
150. State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 474, 715 P.2d 564, 572, 224 Cal. Rptr.
605, 613 (1986).
151. Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 194-95. The author also suggests that
the price reduction method, even when employed by a monopoly, will be effective only under
certain circumstances. Id. at 195.
152. Justice Grodin's observation that price reduction is not a distribution mechanism for
residual funds, see supra note 138, also applies to claimant fund-sharing. In both cases, the
mechanisms avoid the creation of a residual fund-rather than disposing of one.
153. See Bruno v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. App. 3d 120, 123, 79 Cal. Rptr. 342. 343
(1981) ("[I]t is likely that only a fraction of the class members will have the desire, and docu-
mentation, to file an individual claim for part of the damages."). 'But see A CLASS ACTION
SUIT THAT WORKED, supra note 2, at xvi, in which the authors contend that, contrary to
popular belief, informed consumers "will step forward and participate in large numbers."
Newberg reports that when claimant fund-sharing distribution of a common fund has
been used in antitrust and consumer cases, the percentage of total class members who file
claims has ranged from .28% to 48.13%. Appendix 8-4, Tables of Response Rate Levels,
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the pro rata distribution among claimants. Furthermore, it would be to
the class representative's advantage to discourage claims by class mem-
bers, thus providing a disincentive to adequate representation. 154 This
mechanism also deprives unidentified class members of any direct benefit
from the class recovery. It is thus most appropriate for a class in which a
large proportion of class members participate and submit accurate
claims.155
The California Supreme Court, under unusual circumstances, reluc-
tantly approved the claimant fund-sharing mechanism in State v. Levi
Strauss & Co. 156 This case demonstrated some of the difficulties of a
large consumer class action. The State of California brought suit as
parens patriae 157 and a class action under the Cartwright Act, Califor-
nia's antitrust statute. s58 Defendant Levi Strauss & Co., which already
had been charged with retail price fixing by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, 159 entered into a settlement agreement with the California Attorney
General calling for a claimant fund-sharing distribution scheme. The
trial court ordered that, in addition to an extensive media campaign to
alert consumers to the proposed settlement, notice of the settlement be
sent to every household in California, allowing each to submit a claim.
Although the claim form stated that claimants might receive up to $2.00
per pair ofjeans purchased at the inflated price,160 the estimated recovery
amount per pair of jeans was only thirty-five to forty cents.' 61 Thus,
almost $2 million of the settlement fund went toward notifying class
Table I: Response Rates When Common Fund Distributed Pro Rata Among Those Filing
Proofs of Claim, 2 H. NEWBERO, supra note 1, at 206-10, 213.
When the claimants have been paid only their shares, resulting in the creation of residual
funds, the percentage of claimants has ranged from .0006% to 10.47%. See Appendix 8-4,
Tables of Response Rate Levels, Table II: Response Rate When Common Fund Distributed
Only to Pay Individual Claims of Those Filing Proofs of Claim, and Which Yields Unclaimed
Funds, id. at 214-15.
For a discussion of the windfall problem, see supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text.
154. Note, supra note 110, at 453.
155. State v. Levi Strauss & Co., 41 Cal. 3d 460, 476, 715 P.2d 564, 573, 224 Cal. Rptr.
605, 614 (1986).
Claimant fund-sharing was employed in Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 1976-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 60,725 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), in which the federal district court approved a settlement
requiring a telephone answering service, which had allegedly fixed prices, to distribute an equal
amount to each class member.
156. 41 Cal. 3d 460, 715 P.2d 564, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1986).
157. State attorneys general have parens patriae authority to bring actions on behalf of
state residents for various offenses and to recover on their behalf. Parenspatriae is a "concept
of standing used to protect.., quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort, and welfare of
the people." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979).
158. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16700-16703 (West 1964).
159. Petition for Hearing at 8, Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d 460, 715 P.2d 564, 224 Cal. Rptr.
605 (No. SF24699) [hereinafter Petition for Hearing].
160. Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 467 n.4, 715 P.2d at 569 n.4, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 610 n.4.
161. Id. at 464, 715 P.2d at 565, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 606.
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members of their opportunity to claim some thirty cents per pair of
jeans. 162
Other practical problems with the settlement's fund-sharing scheme
had become apparent by the time the case reached the supreme court.
The intervenor calculated that only 20-40% of the class would receive
any type of compensation, since "individual recoveries were so small that
only a minority of class members bothered to file claims." 163 The court
also questioned the veracity of the claims submitted; of the audited
claimants (the top 5% of those who claimed the largest purchases), fewer
than 20% responded when asked to resubmit their claims with a sworn
statement. The court stated that "[t]he magnitude of this negative re-
sponse casts doubt on the accuracy of claims beyond the top 5 percent as
well.'164
The intervenor and amici curiae in the Levi Strauss appeal suggested
that claimant fund-sharing is used effectively only when the recovery is
large enough that class members will come forward to make claims; 165
indeed, amici emphatically contended that claimant fund-sharing
"should never be used in consumer class actions involving trivial dam-
ages." 166 However, neither the intervenor nor amici were willing to de-
feat the expectations of the over one million households that had
responded to the mass mailings and the media campaign, and this con-
cession left the court no practical alternative but to uphold the fund-
162. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 144, at 41.
163. Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 476, 715 P.2d at 573, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
164. Id. at 476-77, 715 P.2d at 574, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 615. With regard to the veracity of
claims, it is interesting to note that researchers who followed up on claims in the antibiotics
antitrust litigation, see supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text, found "a very high degree
of consumer faith in the accuracy and honesty of their claims, and a consequent willingness to
permit those claims to be subject to independent verification" in the group of claimants re-
questing up to $150 in refunds. A CLASS ACTION SUIT THAT WORKED, supra note 2, at 30.
Those claiming more than $150 were given three options: they could I) submit documentation
to support their claims and have their signatures notarized; 2) describe the illnesses for which
the antibiotics were used, identifying the doctors and hospitals involved, and have their signa-
tures notarized; or 3) authorize the court to determine the amount of their refund. Id. at 35.
A mere 4% of claimants chose the first option; 8% chose the second option, and the majority,
54%, chose the third option and allowed the court to determine the amount of their refunds.
33% of the claimants did not respond. Id. at 41. Given that only 12% of class members
claiming large refunds were willing to produce some documentation and have their signatures
notarized, it is possible to question the validity of the claims, although several other factors
could explain, at least in part, the low response rate. One of the problems with consumer class
actions is that class members rarely keep receipts to document their purchases. Further, a
mail request for documentation can encounter several obstacles, including recipients who for-
get to resubmit the claim, those who mistake the letter for "junk mail," and those who are too
busy to pursue the matter further.
165. Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 144, at 28. The amici included the Consumers
Union, the Consumer Federation of California, California Rural Legal Assistance, and Ralph
Nader. Id.
166. Id. at 33.
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sharing settlement. 167
Thus, the court's approval of claimant fund-sharing as a settlement
distribution scheme in Levi Strauss should probably be limited to its
facts. The scheme did not eliminate the distributional problems engen-
dered by the class action, since many of the original claimants had
moved or were otherwise difficult to locate, and substantial interest had
accrued on the settlement fund. 168 In offering the trial court guidance
for distribution of the residue on remand, the court gave little support to
the fund-sharing approach. While conceding the primary benefit of
claimant fund-sharing-that the entire class recovery is disbursed so that
no residual funds remain-the court noted the disadvantages of windfall
to claimants and the lack of benefits to class members who do not submit
claims. The court stated that, for claimant fund-sharing to be advanta-
geous, a large proportion of class members would have to participate and
submit accurate claims.
169
The Levi Strauss court was also unconvinced that the claimant fund-
sharing plan would provide sufficient "overlap" between the injured class
and those benefited to justify use of claimant fund-sharing. 170 In her con-
currence, Chief Justice Bird stated that "[s]uch a plan can scarcely be
considered reasonable as the sole means of distributing a class fund if the
overwhelming majority of class members recover nothing. ' 171 Justice
Lucas, dissenting from the majority's endorsement of the consumer trust
fund concept, quoted with approval the trial court's finding that "there is
no basis for concluding that the proposed plan of distribution discrimi-
nates against any class members."' 172 However, it is difficult to under-
stand this-point of view when, under the proposed claimant fund-sharing,
60-80% of the class may not have received any benefits.
167. Nearly $1.5 million of the settlement fund has already been spent on the present
distribution plan. Intervener criticizes this expenditure, but does not contend that
reversal would somehow restore the funds. Further, over 1 million household claims
have been received and processed, thereby inducing legitimate expectations of com-
pensation among class members. Intervener remains critical of this method of distri-
bution to individual consumers on the basis of largely unverified claims.
Nonetheless, at oral argument, intervener joined amici ... in urging that-with some
additional security precautions-these claims be honored. However, this court can
preserve the present claims only by upholding the settlement....
In a sense, this court is confronted with a fait accompli. The only effective
means to prevent further expenditures of class funds and to vindicate the claimants'
current expectations--ends desired by all the parties-is to affirm the settlement.
Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 470-71, 715 P.2d at 569-70, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 610-11 (citations
omitted).
168. Id. at 471, 479, 715 P.2d at 570, 575-76, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 611, 616-17.
169. Id. at 476, 715 P.2d at 573, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
170. Id. at 479, 715 P.2d at 574, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
171. Id. at 483, 715 P.2d at 578, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (Bird, C.J., concurring).




Thus, claimant fund-sharing not only bars nonclaiming class mem-
ber from any recovery for their injuries, it also presents a significant
windfall problem and substantial administrative costs without ensuring
that the total recovery is actually distributed. As the Levi Strauss court
suggested, the consumer trust fund addresses these concers.
173
HI. The Consumer Trust Fund
The consumer trust fund, the fourth type of cy pres distribution
mechanism, is established by depositing undistributed settlement funds
or damages with a "trustee." 174 In State v. Levi Strauss & Co.,175 the
California Supreme Court in dicta approved the intervenors' proposal for
a consumer trust fund as "entirely consistent" with the court's affirmance
of the terms of the settlement between the Attorney General and Levi
Strauss & Co., and noted that the proposal had "considerable merit.
'176
The consumer trust fund can be arranged in at least two ways.
A. The Foundation Method
The first method resembles a foundation that solicits grant proposals
and then funds projects most in accordance with its goals. Accordingly,
under the foundation method of managing a consumer trust fund, the
trustees finance projects beneficial to the injured consumer class and
those similarly situated.
The Consumer Energy Council of America (CECA) proposed the
foundation method for managing funds collected from oil companies that
173. The petitioners proposed the establishment of a nonprofit corporation to administer a
trust fund established from the residue of the fund-sharing scheme. A board of directors
would be comprised of nine members: five appointed by the Governor and four appointed by
the Attorney General. Petitioners envisioned this corporation as an ongoing venture to receive
undistributed funds from future class actions as well. Id. at 466, 715 P.2d at 567, 224 Cal.
Rptr. at 608.
174. The idea of using a trustee dates back at least as far as Daar v. Yellow Cab, in which
the State of California, as amicus curiae, suggested depositing the cab fare overcharges with
the court or a trustee. It appears that the state's primary goal was to remove the unlawful
overcharges from the defendant's hands. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 715 n.15, 433 P.2d 732, 746 n.15, 63
Cal. Rptr. 724, 738 n.15 (1967).
175. 41 Cal. 3d 460, 715 P.2d 564, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1986).
176. Id. at 471, 479, 715 P.2d at 570, 576, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 611, 617. Although the court
left the distribution of residual funds to the trial court's discretion, it noted that the trial courts
should have "the full range of alternatives at their disposal." Id. at 479, 715 P.2d at 576, 224
Cal. Rptr. at 617. The court listed four criteria to consider in choosing the appropriate cy pres
distribution mechanism:
1) the amount of compensation provided to class members;
2) the proportion of class members sharing in the recovery;
3) the size and effect of the spillover to nonclass members;
4) the costs of administration.
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illegally overpriced gasoline, heating oil, and other petroleum products in
the 1970s. 177 CECA suggested forming a board of trustees comprised of
representatives from state and local governments as well as established
consumer groups. The trustees would fund local energy projects and
study other means of using the funds for the benefit of consumers.
CECA perceived the board of trustees as a safeguard against the hazards
of disbursing the money directly to the Department of Energy, where its
use would be uncertain.
178
A 1981 settlement involving the New York Public Service Commis-
sion provides another example of the foundation method of the consumer
trust fund. In that case, the defendant utility companies agreed to pro-
vide $12 million to fund an independent research program that would
study the Hudson River ecosystem, thereby creating the Hudson River
Foundation for Science and Environmental Research.179
B. The Existing-Organization Method
The second method of establishing a consumer trust fund is to pro-
vide funding to an existing organization to support new and ongoing
projects on behalf of consumers. Like earmarked escheat,18 0 the plan
takes advantage of existing programs, thereby minimizing startup costs
and delays.18 1 Instead of simply leaving money in the hands of the gov-
ernment, however, the existing-organization method ensures a benefit to
consumers because of the organization's fiduciary duty to consumers and
the court's ability to intervene if it appears that funds are being used
inappropriately. 182
One case in which a court successfully awarded a consumer trust
fund to an existing organization is Vasquez v. Avco Financial Services.18 3
In Vasquez, a California superior court found that defendant Avco Fi-
nancial Services of Southern California violated section 1807.2 of Califor-
177. See Note, Collecting Overcharges, supra note 3, at 1057-58.
178. Such concerns were realistic in light of President's Reagan's later attempt to use these
funds to lower the federal budget deficit. See supra note 135. As of this writing, the final
disposition of these funds has not yet been determined.
179. Described in Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 144, at 39.
180. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text.
181. The California Supreme Court noted the cost-saving advantage of allocating funds to
an existing organization, but warned against possible conflicts of interest, in which an organi-
zation would use funds for "pet" projects. Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d at 475, 715 P.2d at 573, 224
Cal. Rptr. at 614. The court suggested that when such conflicts are identified, earmarked
escheat or foundation-type consumer trust funds may be appropriate. Id. at 475 n. 1I, 715 P.2d
at 573 n.l, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 614 n.ll. However, accountability procedures can eliminate
conflict-of-interest problems in the trust fund. See infra notes 182 & 190 and accompanying
text.
182. Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 179 & n.21.
183. No. NCC 11933 B (Los Angeles Super. Ct. Apr. 24, 1984).
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nia's Unruh Act' 84 by "flipping" consumer retail installment contracts
into new loans with substantially higher interest rates. By flipping the
contracts into new loans, Avco circumvented the consumer protection
statute's 18% ceiling on finance charges for installment contracts.18 5 A
consumer brought a class action suit and the State Department of Con-
sumer Affairs entered the case as an intervenor.
The trial court granted the plaintiffs' and intervenor's request that
unclaimed damages be distributed as a consumer trust fund. Avco paid
$1.4 million of the residual settlement funds to Consumers Union of
United States, Inc., West Coast Regional Office (Consumers Union), to
"be used in California for a purpose that is reasonably designed to benefit
those persons who would otherwise have received the refund." 186 Con-
sumers Union was selected in part because of its reputation for vigor-
ously pursuing lawsuits and activities to protect the interests of
consumers. 187
The agreement among Consumers Union, the plaintiffs' attorney,
and the Department of Consumer Affairs provided that funds held by
Consumers Union would be used to reimburse Avco for any late claims
presented by class members; the remainder would be used for administra-
tive, legislative, legal, research, educational, and direct service projects to
benefit those persons who would otherwise have received the refund.
Consumers Union is to review the "problems and needs of low- and mod-
erate-income people in California in connection with consumer credit
transactions, consumer financial issues, and other related matters."'
88
To date, the trust fund has helped Consumers Union finance several law-
suits against financial institutions, involving charges such as fraudulent
interest-rate advertising and discrimination by banks against con-
sumers. 8 9
To comply with the settlement provisions, Consumers Union has
184. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1801-1812.20 (West 1985). The Unruh Act regulates the con-
sumer credit industry.
185. Los Angeles Times, Feb. 3, 1981, § 2, at 1, col. 4.
186. San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 6, 1986, at D3, col. 4. The residual fund existed be-
cause some class members could not be located and some accounts predated Avco's conversion
to a computerized accounting system. Application for Approval of Amended Memorandum
of Understanding with Consumers Union at 2, 4, Vasquez, No. NCC 11933 B [hereinafter
Memo of Understanding].
187. Memo of Understanding, supra note 186, at 4. Consumers Union is a nonprofit mem-
bership organization chartered in 1936 to provide information, education, and counsel about
consumer goods and services and the management of family income. Consumers Union pub-
lishes Consumer Reports, a monthly magazine with a paid circulation of 3.2 million, which
regularly carries articles rating products that Consumers Union has tested, as well as articles
on consumer services, marketplace economics, and judicial actions that affect consumer wel-
fare. Over 300,000 residents of California subscribe to Consumer Reports. Id.
188. Id. Uses of the funds are not limited to those enumerated.
189. San Francisco Examiner, Feb. 6, 1986, at D3, col. 4.
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engaged an advisory board that meets regularly to review existing
projects and make recommendations for future expenditures. Board
members receive a small honorarium per meeting, payable from the fund,
making this an inexpensive method of providing additional expertise for
funding decisions. As a further safeguard to the interests of the plaintiff
class, Consumers Union provides the plaintiffs' attorney and intervenors
with a semiannual report of its past and planned settlement-funded activ-
ities, as well as an annual audited statement of accounts. 190
Another example of the consumer trust fund is the Virginia Envi-
ronmental Endowment, created from $8 million of a $13.2 million fine
assessed against Allied Chemical Corporation for pollution of the James
River.191 The purpose of the Endowment was to benefit the people of
Virginia who were injured by the pollution. The board of trustees, se-
lected by the court, has used interest on the money to fund projects such
as chemical pollution research at the Medical College of Virginia, the
ongoing Institute for Environmental Negotiation, and a related con-
sumer publication. 19
2
C. Criticisms of the Consumer Trust Fund
The consumer trust fund is subject to the same criticisms as cy pres
mechanisms-in general: the possibility of third-party windfall and double
recovery, due process problems, and the courts' lack of equitable powers
to authorize this type of distribution scheme. A criticism unique to the
consumer trust fund, however, is the paternalism involved in determining
how class members' money is used. This criticism is particularly strong
when the entire fund is placed into trust, without paying individual
claims. The California Attorney General has charged that advocates of
the consumer trust fund "believe that a large sum of money in the hands
of consumer advocates . . . is 'better' for consumers than cash in the
consumers' hands." 193 The Attorney General further stated that
"[i]ndividual options about whether to make a claim and how to use
190. Memo of Understanding, supra note 186, at 4-5.
191. Described in Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note 144, at 38-39.
192. Id. Other examples of trust-fund type distributions include: (1) A $25 million settle-
ment, of which $5 million was used to fund a study on the long-term health effects of the Three
Mile Island incident. In re Three Mile Island Litig., 557 F. Supp. 96, 97 (M.D. Pa. 1982),
discussed in 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 10.23, at 387 n.182; (2) the settlement of a hazard-
ous waste enforcement action, which required that the defendant contribute $75,000 annually
to California universities for environmental research. People v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
Civ. S-79-989 MLS (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 1981), discussed in Brief for Amici Curiae, supra note
144, at 40 n.35; and (3) a consumer antitrust suit alleging food retailer price fixing, in which
the settlement terms provided that after seven years, any unexpended food allotments would be
donated to charity. Ohio Pub. Interest Campaign v. Fisher Foods, 546 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ohio
1982), discussed in 2 H. NEWBERG, supra note 1, § 10.24, at 389 n.192.
193. Reply of Respondent State of California to Amici Curiae at 4, Levi Strauss, 41 Cal. 3d
460, 715 P.2d 564, 224 Cal. Rptr. 605 (No. SF24699) (emphasis in original).
one's own money ... would be sacrificed to the [advocates'] view: we
know what's best for you."' 19 4 Arguments such as the Attorney Gen-
eral's, however, neglect a crucial point: the consumer trust fund is much
more likely to provide lasting benefits for the injured class than a one-
time distribution of a paltry sum, especially when managerial problems
render compensation to all class members unlikely.
195
D. Benefits of the Consumer Trust Fund
There also are benefits specific to the consumer trust fund. The con-
sumer trust fund not only fulfills the goals of compensation, disgorge-
ment of illegally obtained profits, and deterrence of unlawful conduct,
but it is also cost effective and conserves judicial resources. Further, it is
the most effective way to benefit all injured consumers, regardless of their
socioeconomic status.
196
A comprehensive study of the claims procedure used in the antibiot-
ics litigation indicates that, in contrast to comparison populations, claim-
ants tended to be middle-aged, well educated, well compensated, and
employed in white-collar occupations, while minorities were under-
represented within the claimant group. 197 If minorities, blue-collar
workers, the less educated, and the less affluent are not participating in
claims for damage refunds in a representative manner, the goal of com-
pensation requires that their rights, as well as the rights of those who
submit claims, be considered.
198
The consumer trust fund is uniquely suited to accomplish such a
result. Funding projects in the public interest is the "next best" method
of using the funds on behalf of these underrepresented groups who are
less likely to file claims. The benefit to the underrepresented, although
indirect, is also increased when the entire fund is placed in trust, because
notice and administrative costs, which normally are paid out of the non-
194. Id. (footnotes omitted).
195. Such managerial problems occurred in the Levi Strauss litigation. See supra notes
163-73 and accompanying text. Counsel for intervenor pointed out that "[i]nstead of a one-
time trivial return ... every year the entire class... would benefit from the civil law enforce-
ment efforts of an endowed private attorney general." Petition for Hearing, supra note 171, at
27. Counsel continued that "the residue of the fund would protect consumers from future
price-fixing and other anticompetitive practices." Id. at 28.
196. See generally A CLASS AcTION SUIT THAT WORKED, supra note 2.
197. See supra notes 132-33 & 164 and accompanying text. The claimants were compared
with (1) the United States household population age 18 and over as sampled by the National
Opinion Research Center General Social Survey of March-April 1976 and (2) the population
of California in 1970 as reported by the United States Census. Id. at xv, 80.
198. See Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1980) ("[Miembers of the class,
whether or not they assert their rights, are at least the equitable owners of their respective
shares in the recovery."); see also Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a Judge's Point of View, 32
ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 299 (1966) (quoting Professor Ben Kaplan, Reporter of the new Rules,
that the "historic mission" of the class action has been to take care of "the smaller guy").
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claimants' share of the funds, are not incurred. A recent poll conducted
by the University of Southern California's Institute on Government and
Politics' 99 revealed that, of the Levi Strauss class members polled, 65%
approved of placing the remaining funds in a consumer trust fund, in-
dependent of governmental or business controls. Such widespread sup-
port for the consumer trust fund indicates that class members themselves
appreciate the long-term benefits that can be derived from such use of
residual funds.
The consumer trust fund also meets the goals of deterrence of future
unlawful conduct and disgorgement of illegally obtained gains by the de-
fendant.2 ° Disgorgement of profits provides both a deterrent to defend-
ants and compensation to injured plaintiffs. Thus, the consumer trust
fund can be used either as a compensatory mechanism that applies
residual funds to benefit the next best class or as the sole compensatory
mechanism of the aggregate damages or settlement fund.
20'
Cost effectiveness is another benefit of both types of consumer trust
funds, particularly when the entire aggregate recovery is placed in
trust.2 0 2 The costs of trustees or a board of advisors can be minimized,
and the expenses of notice, claims solicitation and processing, and dis-
bursal of the funds are avoided completely. As a result, more funds are
available for projects to benefit consumers, including those who have
been injured by the violation.20
3
Yet another benefit of the consumer trust fund is that judicial super-
vision is minimized because the class' counsel serves as a watchdog over
the trustee's ekpefiditures. 204 Moreover, the trustee is bound by a fiduci-
ary duty to use the funds to the greatest possible benefit of the injured
199. A copy of the poll is on file with The Hastings Law Journal.
200. If the defendant settles without an admission of wrongdoing, the consumer trust fund
nonetheless serves the purpose of disposing of the settlement funds to benefit injured class
members.
201. When the defendants' total monetary liability to the class may properly be deter-
mined without individual proofs from class members, then if all members cannot be
located or do not claim their proportional recovery, it is not possible to achieve fully
the compensatory functions of the substantive cause of action that is being enforced
in a class action format. However, the deterrence function of the underlying substan-
tive cause of action can be achieved if the unclaimed residue of an aggregate class
recovery is distributed indirectly for the benefit of class members under cy pres no-
tions, or is escheated to the state government as unclaimed funds, or is distributed in
the sound discretion of the court to some other nonprofit, tax-exempt institution or
organization serving the general public.
2 H. NEWBERG, supra note I, § 10.24, at 391 (emphasis added).
202. See Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 179.
203. See Note, Collecting Overcharges, supra note 3, at 1054 (concluding that use of aggre-
gate damage funds is more effective than small rebates to individual claimants).
204. Interview with Carl Oshiro, Director of Special Projects, Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., West Coast Regional Office, Sept. 23, 1985.
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consumers.20 5 Consequently, after the consumer trust fund is estab-
lished, the court need become involved again only if a disagreement
among the parties arises or the trustee wishes to discontinue its role.
20 6
Compared with other cy pres distribution mechanisms, the con-
sumer trust fund, with few exceptions, 20 7 is the best method of achieving
the ultimate goals of the cy pres doctrine and the consumer class action.
The trustees' fiduciary duty to the injured class, their accountability to
plaintiffs' counsel and the court, and the court's ability to intervene make
the consumer trust fund a superior mechanism to governmental escheat,
whether general or earmarked. The consumer trust fund is superior to
claimant fund-sharing because it provides benefits that reach a greater
number of class members, including those in lower socioeconomic groups
who are less likely to submit claims. The trust fund also avoids the mar-
ketplace disruption caused by the price-reduction mechanism, and pro-
vides more tangible and durable benefits for injured consumers while
advancing the public interest generally. Once the need for a cy pres dis-
tribution mechanism is established, the consumer trust fund will often be
the most appropriate mechanism for furthering the goals of the consumer
class.
IV. Conclusion
Settlement funds and damages often cannot be distributed to each
injured member of a plaintiff class. Class members may fail to submit a
claim, or the class representative may be unable to ideptify and locate
each possible claimant. In some class actions, individual damages may
be so paltry that the administrative cost of reimbursing the injured con-
sumers is greater than the amount of recovery.
The cy pres doctrine, borrowed from the law of trusts, allows the
funds to be used for a similar purpose when it is impossible or impracti-
cal to distribute the funds in a traditional manner. Of the four cy pres
distribution mechanisms discussed-price reduction, escheat, claimant
fund-sharing, and the consumer trust fund-the consumer trust fund
achieves the cy pres purpose most closely. Each of the mechanisms con-
tributes, in varying degrees, to the fundamental goals of disgorgement of
unlawful profits, deterrence of future unlawful activity by the defendant,
205. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
206. See Note, An Economic Analysis, supra note 3, at 179 & n.21.
207. As discussed earlier, other cy pres mechanisms may be more appropriate in a few
situations. For example, if unlawfully assessed sales taxes are already in the state treasury,
governmental escheat may be the appropriate disposition of those overcharges. See supra note
136 and accompanying text. Price reduction may be appropriate when a monopoly has en-
gaged in unlawful overcharges. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. Claimant fund-
sharing may be useful where the vast majority of class members submit claims. See supra note
155 and accompanying text.
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and compensation of class members. At the same time, the cy pres distri-
bution mechanisms have been subject to criticism.
One criticism of cy pres distribution mechanisms is that they may
result in windfall to third parties or to the class claimants. Windfalls are
allowed in several areas of the law, however, and they are a small short-
coming in light of the benefits of cy pres distribution and the available
alternatives: reversion to the defendant or governmental escheat.
Others have challenged the courts' power to order cy pres remedies.
Nonetheless, most jurisdictions do not prohibit cy pres distribution
mechanisms, and many courts have been willing to fashion innovative
remedies to further the goals of the substantive laws under which class
actions are brought.
Other criticisms of cy pres distribution mechanisms concern due
process and federal statutory constraints. The Eisen III court, in refus-
ing to allow cy pres distribution under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23, was concerned with the Rules Enabling Act's prohibition on modify-
ing substantive rights. It is unclear, however, that a mere distribution
scheme can actually modify substantive rights, and the Eisen III court
failed to balance the plaintiffs' interests and the underlying goals of class
actions with the defendants' due process concerns.
Due process challenges particularly criticize the aggregation of dam-
ages for the entire class; defendants are not given the opportunity to con-
test the fact and amount of individual claims. Nonetheless, Federal Rule
23 and state class action statutes not only allow but anticipate that class
suits may go forward without identifying each class member. Further,
once damages are established, the defendant has no legitimate interest in
how those damages are distributed.
Plaintiffs' due process concerns arise when they are unable to claim
their individual recoveries from the pool of damages or settlement funds.
If individual recoveries are substantial, however, it is unlikely that a
court would apply a cy pres mechanism to the entire fund.
The alternative to cy pres distribution mechanisms-reversion to
the defendant, reclassification of damage suits as injunctive suits, and
congressional action-are fraught with difficulties and do little to ad-
vance class members' interests. Governmental escheat, one of the four cy
pres distribution mechanisms examined here, is problematic whether or
not the funds are earmarked for a specific purpose. If not designated for
a specific purpose, the funds do little to further any class interest. Even if
the funds are earmarked, it is difficult to ascertain whether the money is
used for that purpose or whether the government has diverted existing
funds from the earmarked program. Price reduction tends to benefit new
customers more readily than the injured class members, and may disrupt
the marketplace by making a wrongdoer's discounted product more at-
tractive to consumers, thereby injuring his competitors. Claimant fund-
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sharing rewards only class members who submit claims, which not only
results in a monetary windfall to the claimants, but also ignores the
rights of class members who fail to submit claims. Statistically, low-in-
come minorities are underrepresented in the claimant group; thus claim-
ant fund-sharing may ignore large portions of certain socioeconomic
groups.
The consumer trust fund uses money remaining from consumer
class actions to fund either existing private programs or new projects in
keeping with the interests of the class. This mechanism allows much
more control over the funds than is possible in governmental escheat,
and avoids the market disruption of price-reduction plans. Unlike claim-
ant fund-sharing, the consumer trust fund takes into account all class
members, regardless of their socioeconomic status. Further, any windfall
to claimants is not monetary, but takes the form of an increase in services
or in protection of rights. In this era of governmental cutbacks and re-
luctance to finance public interest programs, the consumer trust fund al-
lows money to be used to finance worthy programs in support of the
plaintiffs' interests.
The consumer trust fund can be an ideal mechanism for distributing
the residuum resulting from settlements or judicially created damages
funds in consumer class actions. Although only federal and California
courts have been examined here, all jurisdictions in which cy pres distri-
bution mechanisms are not prohibited should exercise their equitable
powers to allow consumer trust funds when undistributed funds remain
or when each plaintiff's recovery is small. The trust fund is a cost-effec-
tive distribution method that serves the goals of compensation, disgorge-
ment of unlawful profits, and deterrence of future illegal conduct. While
certain issues must be considered on a case-by-case basis, such as the
selection of the trustees, whether to invest the entire fund or only the
residuum after payment of individual claims, and the particular guide-
lines for the types of projects to be funded, the consumer trust fund re-
mains a flexible structure by which both statutory and public policies
may be satisfied.
Natalie A. DeJarlais*
* Member, Third Year Class.
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